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ARTICLE
An analytical framework for postmortems of European foreign
policy: should decision-makers have been surprised?
Nikki Ikani , Aviva Guttmann and Christoph O. Meyer
ABSTRACT
This paper develops a novel theoretical framework for the conduct of
postmortems after major foreign policy surprises for the European Union
and its member states. It proposes a taxonomy of surprise which eluci-
dates how oﬃcials or organisations experience both sudden and slower-
burning threats. It argues that foreign policy surprises in European set-
tings require a closer look at who was surprised, in what way, and when.
The paper outlines six vital performance criteria and three key attenuating
factors, allowing us to better ground judgements about foreign policy
performance as well as to advance realistic recommendations on how to
improve.
1. Introduction
Intelligence analysts, diplomats and foreign policy-makers across Europe admit they have been
taken by surprise several times over the past decade by momentous events in the countries
neighbouring the European Union (EU). With regard to the Arab uprisings, the chief of the UK
Secret Intelligence Service claimed the events were ‘unpredictable’ because ‘all the organisations
that hold the secrets had no clue it was going to happen.’1 Similarly, the rise of the so-called Islamic
State between 2013–15 rapidly outpaced expectations and surprised authorities and terrorism
analysts in both the United States and Europe.2 Finally, for many observers – government oﬃcials
and experts alike3 – a surprising chain of events unfolded in Ukraine after President Yanukovych’s
unexpected decision not to sign the Association Agreement with the EU in 2013 sparked large public
protests, the ﬂight of the President to Russia, the Russian annexation of Crimea and a military conﬂict
in Eastern Ukraine.
Surprise is an inherent and recurrent feature in international relations.4 Yet many practitioners
and scholars argue that the contemporary threats to national security of today are particularly
diﬃcult to anticipate and analyse. This is, variously, attributed to the contestation of the post-Cold
War order by authoritarian states, the gradual erosion of the power of the state vis-à-vis individual
citizens and non-state actors, the power of social and political movements enabled by advances in
technology, or the sheer speed, volume and impact of information production and opinion forma-
tion today.5 While some argue that people and skills in the intelligence community have not kept up
with this transformed threat environment,6 one can also criticise that some skills and insights from
the Cold War era, for instance on the assessment of Russian military capabilities, tactics and
disinformation techniques, have been partially forgotten. The intelligence literature emphasises
the cost of such surprises to decision-makers and, ultimately, the citizens they serve.7 This conclusion
is shared by the literature on disasters and emergencies in other areas.8 Surprised organisations and
decision-makers are more likely to miss opportunities for preventing or pre-empting attacks and
other threats, tend to be less well prepared for managing the unavoidable crises, and more likely to
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look ill-informed and out-of-control in the eyes of citizens, taxpayers, and voters. Therefore, a key
function of estimative intelligence is to reduce the probability for such surprise by trying to
anticipate what might happen, its likelihood, and the expected consequences for government
interests.9
Foreign policy surprises with signiﬁcant negative consequences are usually accompanied by
public criticism and sometimes followed by postmortem inquiries.10 These typically aim to ascertain
not only the soundness of political judgements and actions taken, but also ask whether policy-
makers should have been surprised in the ﬁrst place, whether the surprise was avoidable and,
crucially, what should and could be done to reduce the potential for such surprise in future cases.
Postmortem exercises do often vary in practice in terms of the relative emphasis they place on
accountability versus lesson-learning or how broad and narrow their mandates are. However, the
central purpose of a postmortem as an analytical tool is to identify and learn those lessons from
a speciﬁc case that might improve an organisation’s structural capacity to better anticipate and react
to future threats. It is true that any lessons identiﬁed from postmortems will apply ﬁrst and foremost
to threats and regional contexts that are similar to those at the centre of the inquiry. They cannot
deliver the same lessons as root and branch reviews of the performance of intelligence organisations
and foreign policy systems across a range of tasks. However, we know that postmortems have in the
past produced wide-ranging recommendations regarding reform training, resources, institutions
and processes, many of which are subsequently implemented, for better or worse. Therefore, better
postmortems can improve the basis for judging actors’ performance and for making more realistic
recommendations about what can and should be improved. Even though strategic surprise can
rightly be described as ‘the academically most advanced ﬁeld in the study of intelligence’,11 we
identify four areas for potential improvement to the state of the art:
To start with, most of the core assumptions and ﬁndings in the literature tend to focus on
strategic surprises rooted in a deliberate strategy of states to deceive adversaries and thereby
seize the advantage, usually through surprise military attacks. This focus leaves out those instances
in which actors are taken by surprise by slower-burning, indirect or non-kinetic threats by state as
well as non-state actors.12 Since these types of threats have been on the rise, a suitable analytical
framework should be able to address them.
Secondly, surprise itself remains underconceptualized in the literature. For instance, Handel
discusses the incentives to seek surprise attacks as well as the relationship between the psychology
of surprise and the structure of conﬂict.13 The literature theorises who is likely to engage in surprise
attacks and who are the likely victims and when such attacks are likely.14 Apart from the basic
distinction between strategic and tactical surprise or typologies that address the impact of
surprises,15 the existing literature oﬀers little help in distinguishing between diﬀerent kinds, degrees,
and objects of surprise or how surprise may diﬀer signiﬁcantly among as well between analysts,
policy-planners, and decision-makers.
Thirdly, most evaluative judgements of intelligence performance concentrate on distinguishing
intelligence failures from policy failures, rather than evaluating more comprehensively the foreign
policy process and how it might be improved. Although discussions about the relationship between
intelligence analysts and policy-makers appear frequently in the literature,16 there are few attempts
to ground foreign policy postmortems in broader normative frameworks concerning the role of
experts and evidence in public policy of democratic states. As a result, this paper is not focused
narrowly on ‘intelligence failure postmortems’, but on foreign policy postmortems where actors
often closely interact and depend on each other for their competent performance.
Finally, we want to advance a framework that can be applied to non-US contexts. Most of the
strategic surprise literature, and particularly some of the most inﬂuential works, are written by US-
based scholars on cases that involve the United States government as the main addressee and the
US intelligence community as the main producer of estimative and warning intelligence. We argue
that the US system diﬀers signiﬁcantly from European settings in terms of the role of the intelligence
community, its relationship to policy-makers as well as the foreign policy process. This is relevant
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because the underlying conceptual toolbox for postmortems derived from this literature contains
some hidden or inapplicable assumptions when used in a European setting. By European settings we
mean the foreign policy machinery in Brussels and national foreign policy systems that sometimes
support EU objectives, sometimes pursue their own foreign policy interests separately from, if not
completely independent of, the EU. This paper is not looking at bilateral relations between member
states or relations between some member states and non-EU actors.
The article proceeds as follows: In the ﬁrst section, we will discuss the most important diﬀerences
between US and EU contexts and how they matter to postmortems. Next, we oﬀer a more ﬁne-
grained conceptualisation of surprise and explain why a better measurement of who is surprised in
what way matters for postmortem exercises. Thereafter we discuss performance expectations
towards knowledge producers and decision-makers grounded in a conception of knowledge-
sensitive public policy in democracies. We distinguish between a range of distinct performance
aspects and their trade-oﬀs, but also discuss criteria for distinguishing excusable shortcomings and
mistakes from avoidable, negligent or reckless errors in threat assessments. The ﬁnal section engages
in more detail with the how-to questions of designing postmortems that avoid common problems of
hindsight bias and over-determinism.
Our theoretical argument is underpinned by the ﬁndings from the process-tracing of warnings-
response dynamics in six cases studies involving diﬀerent EU and member states conducted in the
context of two major research projects: Rwanda 1994, Darfur 2004, Georgia 2008, Arab uprisings
2010/2011, Ukraine 2013/14, ISIS/Daesh 2014. These involved extensive document analysis of oﬃcial,
media and NGOs sources as well as more than 170 interviews across the two research projects
underpinning this research conducted over a period of 11 years.17
2. Why diﬀerences between European and US contexts matter to foreign policy
postmortems
What are the main diﬀerences between US and European settings that matter most to surprise-
focused postmortems? As space constraints limit a more comprehensive investigation of all the
potentially relevant factors, we propose to focus here on the role of the intelligence community vis-
à-vis other potential producers of estimative and warning intelligence, the key actors and features of
the foreign policy process as they shape receptivity levels and politicisation dynamics, and, ﬁnally,
the nature of the relationship between knowledge-producers and decision-makers given the inher-
ent tensions over surprising and inconvenient knowledge claims.
The US is unusual compared to other states in terms of the absolute and relative size of its
Intelligence Community (IC) and the diﬀerentiation among agencies specialised in diﬀerent types of
intelligence. It is a highly professionalised and institutionalised community with dedicated career
tracks, training and doctrines, including on warning. It has a dedicated structure for estimative
intelligence over the mid and long-term via the National Intelligence Council, including a National
Intelligence Oﬃce for Warning and an overall Director of National Intelligence. It has the capacity to
produce warning intelligence about a wide-range of countries and phenomena and the coordination
structures to arrive at a consensus view among participating agencies. It operates with substantial
conﬁdence in relaying these assessments to decision-makers and keeping them secret. As a result,
there is more demand as well as justiﬁcation for conducting postmortems focused more narrowly on
the performance of the intelligence community.
In contrast, for historical reasons but also reﬂecting foreign and security priorities, the dedicated
intelligence structures in European settings tend to be smaller in relative terms as well as less
professionalised, institutionalised, coordinated and autonomous from decision-makers. As a result,
a much greater proportion of relevant knowledge about a variety of threats will be produced by non-
IC analysts, whether they are diplomats and desk oﬃcers of Foreign Ministries or analysts from
agencies and ministries devoted to, for instance, development and humanitarian aid. Moreover, the
IC in most European states, and particularly in the Brussels context, is less likely to speak with one
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voice and with less authority than in the US system. While the EU does not have an intelligence
agency as such or the capacity to send agents into the ﬁeld, it does in principle have the capacity to
gather, analyse and produce intelligence in a broader sense from its own varied sources, including
some 140 EU delegations, 16 civilian and military missions, or the EU Satellite Centre. Member states
share, to various degrees, diplomatic reporting and assessed intelligence with EU institutions and
each other through a common communication infrastructure (COREU).18 EU and national oﬃcials
form a close professional network labelled by some an ‘epistemic community’,19 or a ‘community of
practice’20 in foreign aﬀairs and strategic intelligence.21 The implications are threefold: ﬁrst, one
needs to cast the empirical net wider than units that are ostensibly concerned with ‘intelligence.’
Even nationally focused postmortems need to take the EU context and related intelligence ﬂow into
account when assessing what was knowable and known. Warnings will be diverse in content,
reﬂecting distinct cognitive lenses and policy agendas of the originating agencies and ministries.
Secondly, US foreign policy has traditionally reﬂected a grand strategy as a superpower with
geographically wide-reaching interests and the willingness and ability to underwrite security and
shape the rules of global order. The President as the Commander-in-Chief has signiﬁcant authority to
shape and change national security and foreign policy or to appoint and let go secretaries of state.
This authority is further reinforced by the electoral system and the opportunity to make thousands of
political appointments across federal government when coming into power, including in ministries
in charge of foreign and security policy. This means that decisions can be taken and implemented
quickly when warnings are prioritised at the top. The centralisation of authority also means that
foreign policy can be a great asset to the president’s prestige and electoral advantage, but can also
turn into a major liability after alleged or actual failures to anticipate threats and prevent harm.
Foreign and security policy has high salience inside the Washington beltway and is thus vulnerable
to partisan politicisation pressures.
In contrast, with the exception of the UK, most political systems in Europe are not two-party
systems and do not provide the Heads of State with such power in foreign and security aﬀairs. In fact,
most countries are governed by coalitions of two or more parties. This often leads to a situation
where Foreign Ministers and heads of government hail from diﬀerent parties. The EU itself is an
extreme case of the dispersion of authority where most decisive action requires extensive consulta-
tion and often unanimous agreement (or at least constructive abstention) from all member states
represented in the Foreign Aﬀairs Council (FAC). The EU’s HR/VP for Foreign Aﬀairs and Security
Policy has signiﬁcant power of administrative resources and informal power for agenda-setting, but
little autonomous power for decision-making. The EU is therefore often vague in articulating
a ranked order of interests and priorities. This means not only that postmortems in European settings
need to be realistic in their expectations about the speed of decision-making and the prospect of
ﬁnding a consensus, but also consider a wider range of decision-makers with potentially variable
levels of receptivity to warnings.
It largely follows from the above that the ‘intelligence-policy nexus’22 in Washington looks quite
diﬀerent to those in Brussels, Berlin, London, Paris, or Warsaw. A signiﬁcant part of the US-centred
literature on strategic surprise and postmortems engages more or less directly with the signiﬁcant
tensions between a well-resourced and autonomous IC and the political leadership of a given
administration. Generally, this relationship is more formalised and the boundaries between the
two are more clearly deﬁned and policed than in European settings. A great deal of attention is
focused on the question whether a negative surprise was due to an intelligence or a policy failure.
The fear that politicisation pressures undermine professional standards in analysis, make products
less objective, and producers less credible is a central concern of the literature alongside with
discussions over how an optimal relationship should look like (see further below on the Kent-
Kendall-Gates debate).
In contrast, in European settings, the relationship between knowledge producers and decision-
makers is more ﬂuid and closer as compared to the US. There tends to be a less formal distinction
between information and analysis and the policy-planning and decision-making process in terms of
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process as well as personnel. Given the dispersion of authority, and the variety of knowledge
producers, one can ﬁnd less opportunities and incentives for attributing blame and taking credit.
Moreover, top-decision-makers in European settings, and especially within the EU context, have less
authority to pressure and replace oﬃcials and analysts as compared to the US system. There tends to
be less turn-over among civil servants after elections with most senior oﬃcials, analysts and
diplomats staying in oﬃce after a change in administration, except for a handful of the most senior
positions. This is particularly true for the EU’s civil service. Commissioners and High-Representatives
may change every four years but heads of Directorates-General tend to stay for longer. This also
reduces the potential for politicisation pressures somewhat. In this supranational setting, politicisa-
tion as a source of bias can come in various forms and aﬀect relationships in diﬀerent ways. It is less
party-political (although this can a role too), but more frequently structured around perceived or
actual national foreign policy biases or the policy agendas of sub-systems, for instance, regarding the
European Neighbourhood Policy, Development, Trade or the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
3. Conceptualising and measuring surprise in foreign policy
The extensive literature on warning intelligence and (strategic) surprise is strongly concerned with
questions of explaining why surprises occurred and whether they were avoidable,23 whereas little
attention is devoted to diﬀerentiating types or degrees of surprise. Although most authors agree
that surprise is a matter of degree,24 there is no consensus on how to best describe the spectrum
between the extremes. For some, a complete surprise is the occurrence of an event that was not
even considered a low probability, whereas more partial surprises are those when the subjects
may have anticipated some elements, but not others, for instance, recognising the possibility or
even probability of an attack from a given adversary, but failing to answer correctly questions
about the timing, location or means.25 Another closely related distinction is made between
a strategic surprise – the broader and longer-term assessment of a given threat for the main
beneﬁt of senior decision-makers, and a tactical surprise – centred on shorter-term, more focused
questions about the speciﬁcities of threat manifestation, prevention and management.26 Other
works deﬁne strategic surprise as a lack of preparedness based on incorrect judgements regarding
when, where or how an attack would take place, without specifying a particular degree of
surprise.27 Kam identiﬁes three key elements to measure the degree of surprise: whether
a victim’s inconsistent or erroneous expectations and assumptions were held more or less
strongly; the timing; and ﬁnally, the degree to which the victim was prepared to deal with the
event when it occurred, but not the ﬁnal outcome or ultimate success of policy.28
In contrast to Kam and others, we propose to distinguish questions about the nature and degree
of surprise in a cognitive sense from questions of whether such surprise was justiﬁed, or questions of
its impact. Whereas the ﬁrst is core to what is to be explained here, the latter two muddy the waters
by introducing either new normative considerations or largely unrelated extraneous factors into the
explanandum. For instance, there may well have been early and clear warnings from some analysts,
but recipients could still have been surprised because these were from sources with dubious track-
record, who had cried wolf before, or who were contradicted by other more authoritative sources at
the time. Similarly, being well prepared is as much a question of resources, capacities, good political
judgement, and chance as it is about accurate risk identiﬁcation and threat assessment.
Governments may well be completely surprised by an event but turn out to be rather well-
prepared to deal with the consequences as military assets and civil ﬁrst responders can be used
for a range of diﬀerent contingencies.
We argue instead to strip back surprise to the ﬁrst element identiﬁed by Kam and deﬁne surprise
in an actor-centred and primarily cognitive way as the degree to which a given individual, group or
organisational unit in government recognises that recent or current events of substantial consequence to
high-value interests contradict pre-existing assumptions, analytical judgements, and expectations.
Indicators of surprise, or the lack-thereof, at the actor or organisation level are sudden shifts in
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attention and organisational resources to these events and/or the acceptance of new evidential and
causal claims relating to this threat. The lack of policy change or preventive action are, however, not
reliable indicators of surprise. The measurement of surprise is highly time-bound and should
typically relate to the immediate aftermath of a threat manifesting itself in the eye of the decision-
maker. Some postmortems may raise questions about what might be deﬁned as the immediate
aftermath of threat manifestation for three reasons: The ﬁrst concerns the nature of the threat itself.
Except for clear cut-cases of attacks where the armed forces of a state are clearly identiﬁable as the
source, as in Pearl Harbour, many other threats may evolve and manifest themselves in more gradual
or opaque ways, for instance, the growing territorial control exercised by ISIS or cyberattacks that are
detected late and where the scope and scale of the damage remain unclear for a while. Second,
evidence related to threats may initially be ambiguous or strongly contested as to its attribution,
such as in Russia’s deployment of ‘Little Green Men’ without oﬃcial insignia in Crimea ﬂanked by the
Russian authorities’ outright denial of any involvement. Finally, actor-centred surprise measurement
needs to deal with the problem of false or distorted memory if no evidence is available to measure
whether and how oﬃcials expressed surprise in response to new information received at the time.
Leaving deliberately untruthful and misleading statements aside for the moment, both oﬃcials as
well as decision-makers may misremember their own sense of surprise at the time, because memory
itself can be inﬂuenced by largely unconscious concerns of the present, including feelings of regret
or shame. For instance, analysts may inadvertently underestimate their degree of surprise because it
implies a degree of professional failure and potentially even sanctions whereas decision-makers may
unconsciously exaggerate their sense of surprise to justify why they did not act against a threat even
though they had considered it possible. Postmortem analysts need to ascertain in an as objective
and ﬁne-grained way as possible at what points in time oﬃcials or organisations experienced a sense
of surprise without engaging prematurely in critique.
In Table 1 we present a taxonomy of surprise in foreign policy that aims to better support the
purpose of postmortems. We propose to assess the overall degree of surprise across three dimen-
sions, which are both additive to the overall degree and also serve distinct analytical purposes as
they each characterise diﬀerent forms of surprise. The ﬁrst dimension is the degree of cognitive
dissonance caused as a function of the gap between what actors believe to be true in the aftermath
of the threat manifestation and their prior beliefs about the threat. The largest scale surprises –
Taleb’s black swans or the proverbial bolts-from-the-blue – are threats that were not even consid-
ered by actors. At the other end of the spectrum are threats that may well have been considered and
deemed at least possible, but deemed too unlikely to signiﬁcantly shift attention, material resources
or change policy. In the most extreme case of surprise, actors are likely to feel a sense of cognitive
shock and strong pressure to fundamentally transform their threat perceptions, whereas in the
mildest version it would entail updating the probability assessments related to the threat. Again, this
does not imply necessarily a normative judgement of whether these surprises were or could have
Table 1. Towards a taxonomy of surprise within government.
Degree
Dimensions Perfect surprise Signiﬁcant surprise Partial surprise
Dissonance in terms of the
recognised gap between
event and previous
beliefs
Threat not even
considered, implies
cognitive shock and
belief transformation
Threat considered, but deemed
impossible or very unlikely,
implies major Bayesian belief
adaptation
Threat deemed possible, but
unlikely, implies slight to
moderate Bayesian belief
updating
Scope in terms of the range
of surprising substantive
threat characteristics
Threat both strategically
and operationally
surprising
All the most relevant operational
features of threat are surprising,
but strategic notice was
available
Some important features of the
threat are surprising,
strategic notice was
available
Spread in terms of who is
has been most aﬀected
among relevant oﬃcials
Entirety of government,
analysts and decision-
makers
Most analysts and decision-makers Only some analysts and
decision-makers
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been foreseeable as this entails looking at case-speciﬁc diagnostic challenges as well as actor
capacities as we discuss in the next section.
The second dimension is closest to the existing writing on strategic surprise in so far as we focus
here on the scope of the surprise and draw on the distinction between strategic threat assessment and
tactical/operational threat assessment. It is often argued, for instance by Dahl, that strategic intelli-
gence is less diﬃcult than tactical intelligence even though the latter may be more eﬀective for
prompting decision-makers to pay attention and act preventively.29 The question here is how wrong
or right actors were across a range of threat-relevant questions: ‘who is posing a threat’, ‘why’ and
‘under what conditions’, ‘what are their current and future capabilities’, ‘what are their concrete plans to
do what’, ‘where and when’.30 It is relatively easy to identify an actor with hostile intentions, but much
more diﬃcult to ascertain when and how such intentions can translate into signiﬁcant harm. Evenmore
complicated is the diagnostic challenge for threats that are not emanating from one particular actor,
such as a state or terrorist groups, but which emerge from bottom-up dynamics of multiple actors,
trends and social movements, as was the case the Arab uprisings. Even if most actors across Europe
were not surprised that instability in one North African country could spill-over and cause instability in
another, they were still surprised about the way it happened, the timing, speed and extent of the
spread in the region as well as broader and less immediate consequences for European countries.31
Finally, we need to look more closely at the spread of who has been taken by surprise within
a political system. While the conventional distinction between analysts and (political) decision-makers
is useful, we aim for amore ﬁne-grained assessment for two reasons: Firstly, as mentioned in the above,
foreign policy authority is dispersed in a European context, both at the member state level through
coalition governments, and at the European level, where multiple foreign policy institutions co-exist
and sometimes overlap. We know for instance that senior decision-makers within EU institutions and
the Foreign Aﬀairs Council diﬀered in their level of surprise concerning the events in Georgia in 2008
and Ukraine in 2014.32 Secondly, many threats are monitored and assessed by multiple parts of the EU
machinery and through diﬀerent types of products, engaging diﬀerent parts of what might be termed
the intelligence community, including diplomats and other oﬃcials working on threat-relevant tech-
nical issues such as trade, energy and home aﬀairs, especially if threats are not purely military in nature.
It matters whether the sense of surprise was near universal among the most relevant knowledge
producers or whether the spread of awareness among either analysts or, indeed among decision-
makers was particularly uneven. Divergences amongst diﬀerent kinds of analysts or agencies can be
expected given diﬀerences in sources used, disciplinary backgrounds, analytical methods or informal
norms, but could also arise from ways of information-sharing and joint analysis. Another form of an
uneven spread in surprise could be seen in divergent perceptions among oﬃcials at various
hierarchical levels, as senior oﬃcials may at times ignore, discount, or disbelieve assessments by
more junior oﬃcials and may thus end up being more or less likely to be surprised by certain threats.
Again, this does not mean that those who have been most surprised were necessarily at fault, but
pinpointing more precisely who was more or less surprised can help to investigate more accurately
the potential causes. It equally helps to arrive at more persuasive judgements, i.e., whether the
observed diﬀerences can be explained, for instance, by weaker analytical capabilities of an organisa-
tion or rather were caused by political signals and administrative cultures hostile to inconvenient
analytical judgements.
4. Should they have been surprised? Normative expectations for estimative
intelligence production and reception in foreign and security policy
The challenge of casting sound judgements of estimative intelligence production and reception in
foreign policy are just a subset of broader debates in International Relations (IR) and political science
about whether the social sciences can produce suﬃciently reliable knowledge for decision-making
and the appropriate role of expert civil servants vis-à-vis democratically elected decision-makers. The
ﬁeld of IR has struggled to show that the knowledge base for anticipating attacks, civil war, and mass
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atrocities is reliable, speciﬁc, and actionable enough for decision-makers to accept and base
preventive policy on.33 More broadly, many IR scholars harbour doubts that one can establish
defensible criteria for how and what policy-makers should know and learn, let alone on how to
act, because of intrinsic limitations of all claims about the socio-political world, but also because they
consider the notion of policy-success itself as contested.34 This resonates with the view of some
scholars outside of IR who believe that all processes of learning and policy evaluation are based on
underlying intersubjective assumptions that reify particular interpretations of reality and imply
distinctive value judgments.35
In contrast, intelligence studies scholars have not shied away from judging the performance of
analysts and, in some cases blaming mainly policy-makers for failures of prevention or lack of
preparedness. A review of public postmortem inquiries by Farson and Phythian highlights how
they can vary regarding their degree of openness and transparency of investigative processes, their
autonomy from the executive as well as regarding the speed with which they deliver results.36 Yet
despite the growth in academic as well as public postmortem exercises, still little is known about the
theoretical assumptions behind postmortems, including the deﬁnition of appropriate performance
criteria towards either experts or decision-makers rooted in a sound model of knowledge use in
foreign policy.37 Some postmortems devote considerable attention to questions of what should have
been done or not done in terms of political judgement about policy, such as the Chilcot Inquiry’s38
discussion of the premature abandonment of deterrence, whereas other postmortems are more
focused on the accuracy of intelligence products and the performance of their producers, such as the
9/11 inquiry.39 Scholars disagree in their expectations towards knowledge producers as to whether
the provision of accurate intelligence or at least following a sound analytical process are ‘good
enough’, or whether analysts should also bear some responsibility for ensuring that assessments are
actually read, used and have some kind of impact on decision-making.40 The answer to these
questions depends on where one stands in the debate about the ideal intelligence policy-making
relationship, commonly known as the Kent-Kendall-Gates debate. Supporters of the Kent-model
emphasise the need for maximum independence between analysts and policy-makers in order to
protect the objectivity of analysts and their products from politicisation pressures. Conversely,
proponents of the Kendall and Gates-models advocate a closer relationship so that intelligence
reports are actionable, relevant, and correspond to immediate policy requirements.41 Furthermore,
a key issue of contention is how much discretion is given to political judgement about whether,
when and how to pay attention, prioritise and, ultimately, act. It may be relatively uncontroversial to
expect that all plans for terrorist attacks that have reached a certain stage should be thwarted,
whereas in most other cases and types of threat, assessments about what should have been the right
decision, either with or without the beneﬁt of hindsight, requires the consideration of a wider range
of factors as well as some sophisticated counter-factual reasoning.
This narrowness in approach and the lack of clarity in intelligence studies and IR contrasts with the
public policy evaluation literature, which is permeated by strong sets of expectations about ‘evidence-
based policy-making’ and strong norms about precaution in environmental policy-making in areas
such as healthcare or disaster management.42 The epistemic basis for policy-making in foreign aﬀairs is
generally weaker than in domestic public policy. At the same time, expanding our conceptualization of
surprise beyond state-led military attacks requires us to consider more diverse areas of relevant
expertise and therefore include scientiﬁcally-grounded knowledge, for instance relating to the impact
of climate change on migratory movements and conﬂict. Foreign policy-makers do not necessarily
need to listen to advice on what to do and when to act because most of foreign policy, and especially
conﬂict prevention, is not a technocratic exercise in doing ‘what works’ but involves a range of diﬃcult
value-judgements, trade-oﬀs, and uncertainties about unintended consequences.43 Sometimes policy-
makers realise that they do not have any realistic option to stop a crisis from happening or ﬁnd that the
only options are either politically not feasible or come with too high opportunity costs. Policy-makers
still retain the right not to prioritise a particular threat above others and they may well disagree about
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some or all of the actions that are being suggested for preventive ormitigating action – these decisions
require a diﬀerent set of criteria related to good judgement in foreign policy.
We propose to orient our foreign policy postmortems towards a normative guiding model of well-
informed, anticipatory, and collaborative foreign policy making. Well-informed relates both to the
quality of the production process behind estimative intelligence aswell as to the receptivity of decision-
makers to well-evidenced analysis of future threats from authoritative sources. Anticipatory does not
mean that all future harm can be easily predicted or prevented, only that governments should aim to
live up to their strategic and policy commitments contained in their foreign and security strategies with
regard to pre-emptive, proactive, preventive, and resilient foreign policy.44 It means that knowledge
producers ought to invest a minimum degree of eﬀort into the investigation of consequential and
potentially threatening futures, whilst decision-makers should ringfence a minimum degree of band-
width to engage with such futures and high quality warnings. Collaborative does not deny signiﬁcant
asymmetries between and inevitable tensions within the relationship between civil-servants and
decision-makers, but posits that mutual respect and understanding of one another’s distinct roles,
duties, requirements and limitations is central to reaching sound analytical judgements about future
threats aswell asmitigating politicisation pressures. If we break this downeven further in Table 2 below,
we can see that knowledgeproducers aswell as decision-makers canbemeasured against the following
six performance indicators. Even though three of these criteria apply primarily to either knowledge
producers or decision-makers respectively, it is important to recognise their interdependence. It is
perhaps obvious that the extent to which decision-makers can be held accountable depends on the
quality of the intelligence they have received, but equally, intelligence analysts may have good reason
to attribute some of their failings in what questions to ask, when to communicate warnings and how to
make them convincing, to overly remote, inaccessible, disinterested, hostile or even vindictive decision-
makers and the culture they create within an organisation.
4.1. Accuracy
Asking whether knowledge producers reached accurate judgements about threat aspects that
mattered is an indispensable and undisputed component of postmortems involving a degree of
surprise. It is necessary to test whether decision-makers should have been surprised about a given
threat event if, in fact, they had been provided with (largely) accurate assessments of key aspects of
it. Moreover, all knowledge producers ought to aim for maximum accuracy in their analytical
judgements as inaccurate threat assessments can lead to costly mistakes. Assessments of accuracy
should never be the end-point of assessing the performance of knowledge providers, but should
Table 2. Performance expectations for analysts and decision-makers and key mitigating factors.
Performance Criteria Key Factors to Increase or Lower Performance Expectations
Knowledge
producers
Accuracy Case-speciﬁc diagnostic diﬃculty
• Degree of discontinuity
• Speed of dynamics on the ground
Timeliness • Degree and novelty of deception and secrecy
• Degree of credibility of sources
• Degree of inter-institutional cooperation requiredConvincingness
Decision-makers
Due attention & prioritisation Pre-existing capabilities relevant to analysing given threat
• Actor capacity and expertise for information gathering and
analysis
• Access to relevant instruments and resources
Open-mindedness to discordant
claims
Acceptance of threat analysis Helping or hindering political environment
• Stability of government
• Agenda competition, other crises
• Political exploitation of threat, blame games
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leave ample opportunity to consider in a second step mitigating factors that would lead us to higher
or lower accuracy expectations. For instance, while anticipating surprise attacks can be situated at
the more diﬃcult end of the diagnostic spectrum, other types of dynamics relating to mass atrocity
risks or migration can be assessed in probabilistic terms on a more reliable epistemic basis. Yet,
a number of authors rightly stress that one should be cautious about inferring a good analytical
process from accurate assessments or vice-versa.45 Analysts can be right in their conclusions for the
wrong reasons as errors of over- and underestimation of risks can cancel each other out or
unforeseeable chance events intervene as to inﬂuence outcomes. Jervis distinguishes between
type 1 errors of inaccurate analytical claims but having followed a sound intelligence process, and
type 2 errors where accuracy errors could well have been avoided with better processes of informa-
tion collection and analysis.46 Moreover, it is problematic to provide a ‘deﬁnitive’ measure of the
accuracy of predictions and forecasts47 as such claims may be expressed in vague, hedged, or highly
uncertain ways and at various points in time in relation to a given event.
4.2. Timeliness
The accuracy criterion is closely related to the criterion of timeliness of intelligence at the moment
when it is brought to the attention of relevant decision-makers. Especially in cases of bottom-up or
slow-burning phenomena rather than surprise attacks, it is often easier to arrive at a more accurate
and conﬁdent assessment of a threat if one waits for more signals and indications from an evolving
situation, for instance, human rights violations or public protests exceeding country-contingent
‘normal’ levels. However, both deliberate waiting as well as unintentional delays can come at a high
cost, so it is crucial for the analyst not to be overtaken by events and to provide assessments early
enough to maximise options and minimise risks for decision-makers.48 Some policy instruments such
as ﬁnancial aid targeted at some root-causes of conﬂict, or for example the forging of links with the
newly important political actors after the Arab uprisings, require a signiﬁcant amount of time to take
eﬀect. Moreover, some instruments such as the deployment of peacekeepers, election or border
monitors requires a minimum degree of lead-time as many of these assets are not on stand-by, but
require contributions from member states and the delegation of relevant personnel from their
normal line of work. Warning intelligence that arrives too late for such key instruments, will have
lost some or all of their usefulness to decision-makers. The need for timeliness applies most strongly
in cases involving fast-paced developments. Strong liaisons between intelligence and policy depart-
ments can enable the former to provide relevant and timely intelligence to inform policy decisions.49
The greatest challenge here is a rigidity of information processing lines, which can slow down or
hinder the formulation of policies that correspond to the new realities on the ground.
4.3. Convincingness
One of the less examined aspects of the strategic surprise literature is the need for estimative
intelligence in general and warnings in particular to be communicated in a way that is likely to be
understood and believed by the decision-makers it is addressed at. The ability to convince arises
from a combination of factors such as clarity, speciﬁcity, fear appeal, authoritativeness, and cred-
ibility of the source, and more generally, the degree to which intelligence is successfully tailored to
the ‘consumer’ in terms of content, evidence used, timing of delivery, channel, format, and
actionability.50 The literature does recognise that analytical judgements need to be suﬃciently
clear regarding their meaning and importance. ‘The absence of clarity,’ wrote Handel, may
‘strengthen the tendency of some statesmen to become their own intelligence oﬃcer.’51 The
intelligence product thus should have an appropriate form and length, which is digestible for senior
decision-makers who are notoriously short of time. While in the absence of certainty, cautious
warnings are still better than no warnings, the ultimate goal is to provide speciﬁc, clear and reliable
answers to the ‘w-questions’. Intelligence analysts should clearly indicate how conﬁdent they are in
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their judgement, what is known and what is unknown, and what the analysts have inferred.52 They
should not ‘purchase’ greater persuasiveness through exaggerated conﬁdence along the lines of the
notorious statement of former CIA Director George Tenet, who told President Bush there was a ‘slam
dunk case’ that dictator Saddam Hussein had unconventional weapons.53 They should be as speciﬁc
as possible about the probabilities underlying analytical judgements. We know from past cases such
as the Bay of Pigs invasion that decision-makers can easily misinterpret qualitative terms such a ‘fair
chance’ as success being ‘likely’ rather than having odds of merely 1/3.54 Gaps between assessments
and the knowledge on which they are based should continuously be made explicit.55 Eﬀective
communication requires an analyst to have a good understanding of their country’s foreign policy
and its overall priorities in a given region. This ‘common frame’ speciﬁes vulnerabilities and pre-
scribes ways of recognizing relevant developments.56 In addition, the most useful intelligence is
based on a high awareness of the pre-existing levels of knowledge, worldviews, hot-buttons,
agendas, and information processing habits of key decision-makers. Furthermore, the more action-
able the intelligence is, the more likely it is to be listened to and acted upon.57
4.4. Due attention and priority
Postmortem exercises need to take capacity restrictions of foreign policy systems seriously when
judging whether decision-makers have paid enough attention to estimative or warning intelligence.
There is always more analysis than decision-makers have the cognitive resources to pay attention to
and understand. Similarly, there are always more potential problems than states and international
organisations have the capacity to prevent, mitigate or prepare for. The bottleneck problem of
a small number of senior decision-makers sitting at the top of pyramid faced with a massive inbox of
intelligence assessments is particularly pronounced in the case of the United States with its huge and
complex intelligence community, but the generic problem is the same for other actors, except that in
Europe there may be multiple relevant decision-makers at diﬀerent levels. Moreover, decision-
makers may be at least partially forgiven for prioritising more immediate and certain problems
and crises over more distant and uncertain ones. However, this does not mean giving a carte blanche
to decision-makers to simply ignore, delay and deprioritise dealing with intelligence assessments
and warnings that do meet key criteria of objective quality in the terms as discussed above, i.e.,
which are persuasive, timely, and clearly consequential in terms of their implications to citizen
interests. One should particularly look closely at how and when decision-makers engage with
estimative intelligence that already comes with a high degree of priority from within the intelligence
community or is endorsed by a wide-range of analysts and senior oﬃcials. For instance, intelligence
delivered by personal briefers to senior decision-makers or distilled into key documents, presented at
regular decision-making moments in the life-cycle of early warning and risk monitoring exercises, or
being presented in response to a demand by decision-makers or bottom-up as a highly resource
intensive exercise of analysis involving experts from across government. One could also consider the
degree of consensus among analysts over the analytical judgement and the consequences that are
being highlighted to judge whether a particular intelligence estimate should have been given more
or less attention and priority.
4.5. Openness to discordant and potentially inconvenient claims
The openness to having one’s existing beliefs challenged is widely recognised in the literature as
a virtue of intelligence analysis in general and estimative intelligence about surprising and poten-
tially threatening futures in particular. The lack of such openness and challenges as well as the
inﬂuence of an excessive culture of consensus are also frequently noted vices in postmortems. As
Jervis wrote about the case of Iraq, once the view was established that the country was producing
weapons of mass destruction ‘there not only were few incentives to challenge it, but each person
who held this view undoubtedly drew greater conﬁdence from the fact that it was universally
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shared.’58 This conﬁrmation bias as well as the failure to examine alternative hypotheses can equally
exist at the decision-maker level. Risks of group think in the decision-making process occur when
members do not express deviating opinions, challenge assumptions, or suggest new ideas that
others may disagree with. We know from research that some senior decision-makers, such as the
former EU High Representative Javier Solana, actively seek out and encourage alternative views from
civil servants and experts, while others avoid such views through various ﬁltering and bypassing
mechanisms such as close advisors and separate committees, strongly push-back against discordant
evidence when confronted with it, or use their power to intimidate, exclude and repress sources with
politically inconvenient advice. While the politicisation of intelligence can be inevitable for issues
that are made salient through the news media or become subject of political contestation, it matters
greatly how both analysts and decision-makers deal with such politicisation and the pressures it
brings to reduce politically inconvenient messages, to screen-out complexity and countervailing
evidence, and to protect conventional wisdom.
4.6. Acceptance of threat analysis
The expectation that decisionmakers should accept intelligence in terms of its knowledge claims
about a probable future does not interfere with their political prerogative in decision-making about
whether to act on any recommendations. Moreover, there are occasions when decision-makers may
have justiﬁed conﬁdence that their own analytical judgements are superior to the advice they are
getting, for instance, if they themselves have relevant training and experience related to the conﬂict
regions, are able to draw on their own contacts and networks grown over a period of time, or have
privileged access to and insights about the thinking of foreign senior decision-makers due to their
interactions with them. Naturally, one will need to be very cautious before accepting such explana-
tions for disbelieving or discounting analysis produced through a rigorous process involving author-
itative experts from within government as the literature highlights the tendency of politicians to
overestimate their own knowledge and analytical acumen.59 On the other hand, one will need to
take into account the strength of the evidence underpinning the intelligence, the track-record and
authority of the main source, and other factors to do with the clarity and persuasiveness of the
intelligence as discussed previously. Decision-makers are perfectly entitled to reject claims made
from a source with known biases or who can be rightly suspected of hidden political biases and
motivated by an intent to manipulate. On the other hand, decision-makers should be held to account
if they simply disbelieve high-quality intelligence for reasons to do with a lack of motivation to
engage with the evidence (laziness), a reluctance to believe because it would amount to an
admission of previous failure (denial), and misplaced optimism that harm would be avoided so
that strongly held-policy preference can still be achieved (wishful thinking).
5. Key performance enabling or constraining factors
Assessments of whether or not analysts or decision-makers should have been surprised or performed
well in a case depends on interactions between these actors and they thus should not be judged in
isolation from each other’s performance.60 At the same time, the performance of both analysts and
decisions-makers needs contextualisation as there can be aggravating or mitigating reasons for
being caught by surprise. We propose that the three most common factors are case-speciﬁc
diagnostic challenges, pre-existing relevant capacities for knowledge production and the inﬂuence
of the prevailing political environment at the time.
First, the ability of knowledge producers to anticipate or predict certain events from happening
is constrained by the diagnostic diﬃculty of the case at hand, which itself is a function of several
factors. One crucial factor is the degree of discontinuity the event poses with the status-quo ex
ante. To what extent does the event break with the patterns of the past? Humans tend to take
a linear view of the future, perceiving it as an extrapolation of present trends. And while most
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future occurrences can indeed be extrapolated from the present, for example in the ﬁeld of climate
change, in the uncertain international system, events with most impact are often non-linear, black
swans, or bolts from the blue.61 The search for such events poses diagnostic challenges to the
intelligence analyst as envisioning a multiplicity of futures, their possible consequences, and their
threat levels requires often costly out-of-the-box thinking. And even then, prediction is not always
certain. The massive ripple eﬀects the self-immolation of Mohamed Boazizi on 17 December 2010
has had across the Middle East, causing the Arab uprisings in multiple countries and even leading
to civil war, led to a series of events impossible to forecast, even though experts knew for years
that countries like Tunisia and Egypt were powder kegs.62 Cognitive simpliﬁcation – i.e., making
sense of complex patterns by simplifying and ﬁltering them into familiar frames, patterns, and
stories – exacerbates this diﬃculty of anticipating large breaks with the status quo.63 Surprise-
sensitive forecasts of emerging threats are very resource-intensive as it requires manpower to
distinguish weak signals of change from the noise of masses of routine reporting and data.
Another objective diagnostic diﬃculty arises from the complexity and speed of threat dynamics
as well as diﬃculties of obtaining information about geographically remote and underdeveloped
countries or regions. For instance, one of the most surprising features of the genocide in Rwanda
was the sheer speed of the killing combined with the challenge of getting reliable information
from remote parts of the country.64 In the case of Ukraine, it was diﬃcult to gauge the military
situation on the ground in Crimea in February and March 2014, or to even identify an unambig-
uous casus belli.65 The combination of deception and the spread of false information surrounding
the Crimea invasion meant that the factual threshold evidence of Russian actions in Crimea had to
cross was high.66 Although deception is as old as warfare itself,67 Russia’s ability to ‘merge the
overt and the covert’ in combination with its so-called ‘information operations’ underlines how
modern threats have changed.68 This ties into another complicating factor, namely the degree of
credibility of both sources and experts when ﬂagging threats, which is aﬀected by previous
communications. Georgia faced this problem in 2008, when Western governments were hesitant
taking its account of Russian intentions at face value due to the Georgian reputation for ‘crying
wolf’.69 Finally, the diagnostic diﬃculty of a case is impacted by the degree to which the situation
cuts across various areas of technical and geographic expertise, requiring a combination of
knowledge from diﬀerent bodies in an organization.
The second category of enabling or constraining factors concerns pre-existing knowledge and
policy response capacities to anticipate and potentially respond to this kind of threat. It concerns
the capacity of and processes in intelligence production. Regarding capacity, the question is whether
the resources and expertise available was suﬃcient to engage in high quality information gathering
and analysis for the case at hand, for instance, were there relevant country experts or previous
country or case experience of senior decision-makers. After the Ukraine crisis, many European
countries for example criticized the steep decline in Russian speakers and Russia experts after the
end of the Cold War. Equally important is access to relevant intelligence (e.g., satellite images, human
intelligence from the inner circle of the conﬂict party, up-to-date and reliable information from local
embassies, ﬁeld missions, social media or envoys). Former CIA deputy director Michael Morell
described how the CIA was surprised by the Arab uprisings precisely because it did not access the
right sources of intelligence: ‘We failed because to a large extent we were relying on a handful of
strong leaders in the countries of concern to help us understand what was going on in the Arab
street. We were lax in creating our own windows [. . .] the intelligence community was not doing
enough to mine the wealth of information available through social media.’70 Regarding process, an
important question is whether there were well-established assessment procedures for the kinds of
risks or threat at hand and whether the processes followed good practice in terms of monitoring in
reviewing. Another important question regarding knowledge and policy response capacities is
whether intelligence producers had access to relevant instruments or resources that could be
mobilised at suﬃcient speed to address the problem if timely intelligence had been provided.
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A third and ﬁnal factor is the prevailing political environment which may greatly impact both
intelligence production and receptivity to it. Power transitions in government or major personnel
changes in intelligence production have the potential to greatly distract both decision-makers
and analysis. Additionally, decision-makers routinely deal with a number of crises and issues
simultaneously. The Ukraine crisis, for example, played out when EU capitals were already being
overwhelmed by the global ﬁnancial crisis, the eurozone crisis, and the aftermath of the Arab
uprisings. Such agenda competition may impact receptivity to intelligence. What is more,
decision-makers are, like the intelligence analysts, human beings that struggle cognitively with
entertaining multiple hypotheses and scenarios at the same time.71 Meanwhile, despite the fact
that both decision-makers and analysts may be to some extent distracted by either foreign or
domestic crises, we should expect a degree of ringfencing of resources for anticipating and
responding to upstream problems.
More importantly, decision-makers often stand to gain or lose politically from the way a threat or
crisis is perceived and framed. Scholars have asserted that after a strategic surprise, political leaders
are more likely to attribute events to domestic failings than to the deception or secrecy of the
adversary.72 Warnings and threats can be framed by politicians in a process in which blame and
responsibility are attributed with the aim of political gain. Moreover, warnings about a certain threat
may thus become subject of intense politicisation within the government or between government
and opposition. Political conﬂict and contestation thus can impact receptivity to intelligence, but
equally the way the intelligence is interpreted and used.
6. Conclusion
We have argued that the strategic surprise literature could beneﬁt from grounding postmortems in
broader normative conceptions of the role of experts and knowledge in public policy-making and
as well as from showing greater sensitivity to the European setting, which diﬀers in a number of
important aspects from the US intelligence-policy nexus. Our argument is that a postmortem
framework that works for both EU institutions as well as European member states has wider
applicability to other national contexts than one which is modelled, implicitly or explicitly, on
studies of a country that is obviously important but also in many respects atypical. We proposed to
broaden our conceptualisation of surprises beyond sudden attacks to include slower-burning, non-
kinetic phenomena like the rise of the Islamic State, the Ukraine crisis or the Arab uprisings. The
new taxonomy of surprise in foreign policy is more ﬁne-grained than existing accounts in order to
better elucidate the diﬀerent ways oﬃcials or organisations may experience a strategic surprise. By
pinpointing more precisely who was surprised, in what way, our framework can help to investigate
more accurately the potential causes of surprise and allows observers to cast more accurate
normative judgements on whether the surprises could have been avoided and if so, in what
way. This feeds into the overarching aim of evaluating how the foreign policy process handled
these surprises taking key attenuating factors seriously. These include diagnostic diﬃculties
speciﬁc to each country or conﬂict case, the prevailing political conditions at the time, as well as
pre-existing resources related to particular countries or threats. Some of the performance criteria
relate primarily to intelligence producers, while others mainly apply to decision-makers or the
organisational space between-them, which shapes what kind of interaction and relationships are
possible. We hope this framework enables scholars and practitioners conducting postmortems to
separate questions of case-speciﬁc intelligence performance, from the broader analysis of what
cognitive, organisational or procedural factors produced that performance. It enables us to ask
‘what if’ questions that elucidate which changes are likely to improve intelligence assessments in
the future for similar but not identical cases.
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